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Said’s Political Humanism 
An Introduction 
Bashir	Abu-Manneh	
In	1967,	politics	burst	into	Edward	Said’s	life	and	changed	him	instantly	and	
permanently.	From	a	conventional	liberal	humanist	literary	critic,	ruminating	on	the	
relationships	between	individual	author	and	human	existence,	Said	became	a	political	
critic	and	public	intellectual	committed	to	Arab	and	Palestinian	freedom	and	self-
determination.	What	triggered	this	transformation	was	Israel’s	decisive	victory	in	the	
June	1967	war	in	which,	in	a	mere	six	days,	Israel	occupied	the	remainder	of	Palestine,	
Syria’s	Golan	Heights,	and	Egypt’s	Sinai.	The	abject	defeat	of	Nasser’s	Arab	nationalism	
left	Arabs	reeling	in	yet	another	historical	crisis	of	self-examination,	less	than	two	
decades	after	the	loss	of	Palestine	in	1948.	With	further	domination	came	new	
resistance,	and	Palestinians	rose	to	challenge	the	new	Arab	status	quo.1	
In	one	of	his	first	political	essays	after	1967,	Said	would	dub	this	new	alternative	
“Palestinianism.”	The	shift	was	distinct:	“from	being	in	exile	to	becoming	a	Palestinian	
once	again”;	from	“a	political	living	death”	to	“vitality”	and	“a	revitalization	of	thought.”	
For	Said,	“[A]	void,	felt	by	every	Palestinian,	has	been	altered	by	an	event	into	a	
discontinuity	…	One	is	inert	absence,	the	other	is	disconnection	that	requires	
reconnection.”	To	describe	this	new	reality	a	“whole	range	of	Palestinian	speech	has	
erupted,”	including	Said’s	own.	A	political	baptism	of	a	whole	people	is	being	announced	
here:	“Previously	a	classless	‘refugee,’	since	1967	he	[the	Palestinian]	has	become	a	
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politicized	consciousness	with	nothing	to	lose	but	his	refugeedom.”	Note	the	language.	It	
echoes	Marx	and	Engels’s	famous	phrase	from	The	Communist	Manifesto:	“The	
proletarians	have	nothing	to	lose	but	their	chains.”	But	Said	substitutes	a	class	of	
workers	with	a	nation	of	refugees	that	is	coming	into	political	consciousness	and	
determining	their	own	fate.	The	“new	Palestinian	ideology,”	he	proudly	proclaims,	
“owes	next	to	nothing	to	the	Western	Left,”	which	he	saw	as	either	complicit	with	Israel	
(like	official	communism)	or	contributing	nothing	to	Palestinians.2	Substituting	nation	
for	class	and	distancing	himself	from	the	socialist	left	are	early	indications	of	Said’s	
emerging	political	orientation:	nationalist	but	neither	communist,	Marxist,	nor	
internationalist.	Said’s	challenge	was	now	clear:	how	to	contest	Israel’s	occupations	and	
Western	empire	using	the	ideological	tools	and	instruments	he	selected.	
The	impact	of	1967	goes	much	deeper	than	Said	writing	political	tracts	and	
analyses	of	the	question	of	Palestine.	Its	effect	was	structural	and	marked	everything	
Said	did	afterward.	The	year	1967	meant	a	long-lasting	intellectual	orientation	that	
focused	Said’s	critical	faculties	on	the	nexus	of	colonialism	and	imperialism	in	the	region	
and	motivated	him	to	locate	empire’s	cultural	and	political	forms	within	the	West’s	own	
national	cultures.	Said’s	own	process	of	becoming	was	thus	triggered:	From	being	a	
mainstream	literary	academic,	he	would	become	the	most	influential	cultural	critic	of	
empire	of	his	generation.	To	understand	the	nature	and	contours	of	this	change	is	to	
understand	Edward	Said:	his	varied	intellectual	and	cultural	investments;	his	distinct	
methodological	combinations,	ambivalences,	and	anxieties;	and	his	firm	anti-imperial	
principles.	During	the	period	of	the	defeat	of	the	grand	narratives	of	global	
emancipation	(including	decolonization	and	socialism),	Said	emerges	as	a	defender	of	
the	colonized	and	oppressed.	First,	as	a	new	species	of	radical	intellectual:	anti-
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imperialist	but	not	socialist;	materialist	but	oblivious	to	political	economy;	political	but	
inflating	culture	in	human	affairs.	Second,	as	embodying	anxious	critical	energy:	in	
search	of	anchoring	foundations	yet	profoundly	skeptical	about	their	permanence	and	
value.	Third,	as	an	endlessly	curious	mind:	engaging	with	intellectual	and	political	
questions	beyond	the	narrow	confines	of	his	academic	discipline.	
How	can	one	characterize	the	nature	of	Said’s	thought	and	capture	the	range	of	
his	contributions?	For	someone	as	prolific	and	erudite	as	Said,	whose	work	ranges	
widely	from	British	fiction,	Oriental	studies,	Middle	East	politics,	to	music	and	cultural	
theory,	this	is	no	easy	feat.	No	one	volume	is	adequate	for	the	task,	and	it	is	not	the	aim	
of	this	one	to	be	either	exhaustive	or	complete.	Before	I	delineate	the	specific	
contribution	that	this	volume	aims	to	make	to	scholarship	on	Said	and	postcolonial	
studies,	I	propose	to	focus	on	some	core	features	of	Said’s	thought.	These	may	help	
orient	the	reader	to	Said’s	oeuvre.	Exactly	because	Said’s	work	ranges	across	disciplines	
and	themes,	it	is	essential	to	identify	his	core	intellectual	features	to	understand	what	is	
distinctive	about	Said	as	critic	and	theorist.	The	features	I	examine	speak	to	his	method	
and	style	as	well	as	to	his	intellectual	tendencies	and	critical	dispositions.	I	have	
clustered	them	into	three	categories:	his	political	humanism,	commitment	to	
modernism,	and	antisystemic	theory.	I	will	spend	most	of	my	time	defining	his	
distinctive	humanism	and	elaborating	on	why	it	is	so	consequential	in	his	work.	I	will	
then	briefly	link	it	to	the	two	other	features	of	his	thought.	
Why	is	Said	a	political	humanist?	Humanism	is	hard	to	define	and	its	multiple	
forms	range	across	civilizations	and	traditions.	To	specify	Said’s	own	sense	and	usage	is	
to	say	that	Said	saw	himself	as	both	a	cultural	and	secular	humanist.	Cultural	because	“it	
encapsulates	the	idea	that	the	humanities	are	worth	studying	because	they	foster	
4 
valuable	features	of	human	life	and	celebrate	valuable	qualities	of	human	beings.”	
Secular	because	it	involves	“the	positive	affirmation	that	human	beings	can	find	from	
within	themselves	the	resources	to	live	a	good	life	without	religion.”3	Said	believed	in	
the	humanities	as	an	intellectual	vocation	and	thought	that	it	should	return	to	its	
“rightful	concern	with	the	critical	investigations	of	values,	history,	and	freedom.”	He	also	
thought	that	the	questioning	of	certainties	entailed	by	humanism	should	be	turned	
against	the	artistic	and	literary	products	of	the	humanities	“to	challenge	and	defeat	both	
an	imposed	silence	and	the	normalized	quiet	of	unseen	power	wherever	and	whenever	
possible.”4	What	makes	Said’s	humanism	political	is	his	preoccupation	with	uncovering	
culture’s	complicities	in	injustice	and	power,	and	exposing	its	role	in	historical	injury.	
What	if	the	culture	Said	revered	and	admired	so	much	did	play	a	role	in	the	political	
oppression	and	domination	he	despised?	That	is	Edward	Said’s	defining	problem.	In	
Culture	and	Imperialism,	he	defines	it	as	follows:	how	to	connect	“the	prolonged	and	
sordid	cruelty	of	such	practices	as	slavery,	colonialist	and	racial,	and	imperial	
subjection”	with	“the	poetry,	fiction,	and	philosophy	of	the	society	that	engages	in	these	
practices.”5	
Said	had	a	lifelong	commitment	to	the	philological	tradition	epitomized	by	Erich	
Auerbach’s	Mimesis:	The	Representation	of	Reality	in	Western	Literature	(1953).	What	
struck	him	most	about	Auerbach’s	project	is	that	it	affirmed	the	redeeming	value	of	a	
sympathetic	imagination	able	to	capture	and	affirm	the	particularity	of	individual	
authors	at	a	time	of	devastating	European	interwar	conflict	and	antagonism.	To	see	
beyond	national	divisions	and	codify	a	common	human	heritage	was	key.	What	
captivated	Said	about	Auerbach’s	humanism	was	“its	emphasis	on	the	unity	of	human	
history,	the	possibility	of	understanding	inimical	and	perhaps	even	hostile	others	
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despite	the	bellicosity	of	modern	cultures	and	nationalisms,	and	the	optimism	with	
which	one	could	enter	into	the	inner	life	of	a	distant	author	or	historical	epoch	even	
with	a	healthy	awareness	of	one’s	limitations	of	perspective	and	insufficiency	of	
knowledge.”6	Said	defended	the	universal	kernel	of	this	vision	–	even	when	he	came	to	
worry	about	its	purely	European	register.	He	also	cotranslated	Auerbach’s	powerful	
defense	of	the	concept	of	world	literature	“Philology	and	Weltliteratur.”	In	the	face	of	
emerging	Cold	War	divisions	and	the	pressures	of	cultural	standardization,	Auerbach	
sought	to	renew	humanism.	He	did	so	by	extending	his	literary	brief	to	the	whole	globe	
and	gesturing	toward	a	conception	that	seeks	“a	spiritual	exchange	between	peoples,”	
“the	reconciliation	of	peoples,”	and	an	exchange	“between	partners”	that	“hastens	
mutual	understanding	and	serves	common	purpose.”	As	he	concludes:	“our	philological	
home	is	the	earth:	it	can	no	longer	be	the	nation.”7	These	are	constitutive	motifs	for	
Said:	culture	as	a	precarious	repository	of	human	value	in	a	world	debased	by	power	
and	national	antagonism.	
But	what	if,	again,	culture	is	not	only	involved	in	worldly	politics	but,	through	its	
own	workings,	contributes	to	conflict	and	dehumanization?	What	if	humanism	and	the	
humanities	are	as	much	a	part	of	the	problem	as	the	solution?	More.	What	if	culture	
leads	to	political	domination?	As	when	Said	says:	“I	very	much	doubt	that	England	
would	have	occupied	Egypt	in	so	long	and	massively	institutionalized	a	way	had	it	not	
been	for	the	durable	investment	in	Oriental	learning	first	cultivated	by	scholars	like	
Edward	William	Lane	and	William	Jones.”8	Said’s	answer	to	this	possibility	is	“secular	
criticism,”	an	ideological	house	clearing	of	sorts.	Rather	than	isolating	both	text	and	
critic	from	historical	circumstances,	contemporary	criticism	needs,	he	posits,	to	re-
engage	with	the	world,	actively	interfere	in	it,	and	undermine	the	unjust	status	quo	
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created	by	“a	new	cold	war,	increased	militarism	and	defense	spending,	and	a	massive	
turn	to	the	right	on	matters	touching	the	economy,	social	services,	and	organized	labor.”	
Simply	put,	Said	argues	that:	“The	realities	of	power	and	authority	–	as	well	as	the	
resistances	offered	by	men,	women,	and	social	movements	to	institutions,	authorities,	
and	orthodoxies	–	are	the	realities	that	make	texts	possible,	that	deliver	them	to	their	
readers,	that	solicit	the	attention	of	critics.	I	propose	that	these	realities	are	what	should	
be	taken	account	of	by	criticism	and	the	critical	consciousness.”9	
Imperialism	was	the	one	reality	that	exercised	Said	most.	After	1967,	it	hit	home.	
As	he	clearly	states	in	his	massively	influential	Orientalism	(1978):	“The	web	of	racism,	
cultural	stereotypes,	political	imperialism,	dehumanizing	ideology	holding	in	the	Arab	
or	the	Muslim	is	very	strong	indeed,	and	it	is	this	web	which	every	Palestinian	has	come	
to	feel	as	his	uniquely	punishing	destiny.”10	Orientalism’s	theoretical	contradictions,	
between	an	Auerbachian	humanism	and	a	Foucauldian	antihumanism,	have	been	widely	
discussed.	What	I	want	to	do	here	is	look	at	the	problems	of	knowledge	and	imperial	
power	that	Orientalism	raises	in	its	sequel	Culture	and	Imperialism	(1993).	Because	it	
examines	both	domination	and	resistance,	domestically	and	in	the	outlays	of	empire,	
Culture	and	Imperialism	is	a	more	complete	theorization	of	that	nexus.	It	also	allows	
Said	to	anchor	his	political	humanism	in	Fanon’s	emancipatory	“new	humanism.”	
The	basic	claim	Said	makes	in	Culture	and	Imperialism	is	that	national	cultures	
in	the	West	are	imperial.	This	is	not	a	new	claim.	Orientalism	advanced	it	in	a	more	
ontological	manner:	that	anyone	who	speaks	about	the	Orient	is	subject	to	the	
constitutive	pressures	and	enunciative	powers	of	Orientalist	knowledge.	For	example:	
“So	far	as	anyone	wishing	to	make	a	statement	of	any	consequence	about	the	Orient	was	
concerned,	latent	Orientalism	supplied	him	with	an	enunciative	capacity	that	could	be	
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used,	or	rather	mobilized,	and	turned	into	sensible	discourse	for	the	concrete	occasion	
at	hand.”11	In	Culture	and	Imperialism,	this	notion	is	generalized.	The	book	is	not	only	
about	how	the	West	narcissistically	develops	self-constituting	and	self-generating	
(Oriental)	knowledge	about	others	but	also	about	how	active	resistance	in	the	colonies	
breaks	that	generative	power	and	makes	new	knowledge	in	the	center	possible.12	Until	
the	consequential	moment	of	decolonization,	empire	and	culture	can,	for	Said,	be	
spoken	about	as	practically	the	same.	
To	convey	the	sweep	and	permeation	of	imperial	culture,	two	examples	from	the	
text	will	suffice.	First:	“The	great	cultural	archive,	I	argue,	is	where	the	intellectual	and	
aesthetic	investments	in	overseas	dominion	are	made.	If	you	were	British	or	French	in	
the	1860s	you	saw,	and	you	felt,	India	and	North	Africa	with	a	combination	of	familiarity	
and	distance,	but	never	with	a	sense	of	their	separate	sovereignty.”	Second:	“With	few	
exceptions,	the	women’s	as	well	as	the	working-class	movement	was	pro-empire.	And,	
while	one	must	always	be	at	great	pains	to	show	that	different	imaginations,	
sensibilities,	ideas,	and	philosophies	were	at	work,	and	that	each	work	of	literature	or	
art	is	special,	there	was	virtual	unity	of	purpose	on	this	score:	the	empire	must	be	
maintained,	and	it	was	maintained.”13	Imperialist	assumptions	and	imperatives	affected	
the	realistic	novel,	fiction	narratives,	philosophers,	deconstruction,	Marxism,	opera,	and	
so	forth.	In	short:	“Modern	imperialism	was	so	global	and	all-encompassing	that	
virtually	nothing	escaped	it”	(81).	I	shall	show	in	the	following	text	why	modernism	for	
Said	disrupts	this	total	imperial	hegemony.	But	what	I	want	to	emphasize	now	is	that	
the	reason	why	Said	views	Western	culture	as	inescapably	imperial	is	clear:	because	he	
regards	silence	or	indifference	to	empire	as	consent.	
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What	the	decolonization	generation	taught	him	was	“that	in	so	globalizing	a	
world-view	as	that	of	imperialism,	there	could	be	no	neutrality:	one	either	was	on	the	
side	of	empire	or	against	it,	and,	since	they	themselves	had	lived	the	empire	(as	native	
or	as	white),	there	was	no	getting	away	from	it”	(337,	emphasis	added).	These	may	well	
have	been	the	political	terms	of	the	decolonization	struggle	in	the	colonies:	If	you	are	
not	with	us,	then	you	are	with	the	colonists.	Said,	however,	assumes	that	metropolitan	
culture	was	as	contentious	and	affected	by	imperial	struggle	as	colonized	society,	and	
that	not	taking	a	position	about	empire	in	the	imperial	metropolis	is	the	same	as	not	
taking	one	in	the	colonies.	This	equation,	however,	makes	no	historical	sense.	Not	only	
because	it	is,	in	fact,	the	structural	privilege	of	national	societies	that	had	overseas	
empires	(like	Britain)	to	be	able	to	ignore	empire	–	unless	one	was	part	of	the	small	
elite	minority	actively	involved	in	running	it	–	but	also	because	attitudes	to	empire	
varied	across	classes	and	were	strongly	impacted	by	purely	domestic	concerns.	Only	
exceptionally	was	the	choice	either	for	or	against.	The	Boer	War	is	a	good	example,	
when	British	elite	interests	in	South	Africa	required	public	support	and	involvement.	
Mostly,	though,	empire	was	beyond	the	realm	of	everyday	concern	for	the	majority	of	
Britons,	and	the	imperial	elite	wanted	to	keep	it	that	way.	
This	is	the	argument	that	Bernard	Porter	makes	in	The	Absent-Minded	
Imperialists	(2004).	Indifference	to	empire	and	a	lack	of	commitment	to	it	were	
widespread	in	British	society.	Britain,	obviously,	benefitted	from	empire,	and	its	
material	impact	was	widespread	(sugar,	profits,	trade,	etc.).	Porter	recognizes	this,	and	
puts	it	in	no	uncertain	terms	when	he	says:		
The	empire	probably	affected	nearly	everyone	materially	…	They	
[effects]	include	Britain’s	participation	in	two	world	wars,	her	economic	
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rise	and	decline,	the	perpetuation	of	her	class	structure,	and	the	state	of	
her	people’s	teeth.	In	all	of	these	ways	the	empire	impacted	hugely	on	her	
culture	and	society.	That	should	be	enough	material	repercussions	for	
anyone.	But	they	were	all	indirect.		
After	reviewing	hundreds	of	tracts	and	diaries,	he	does	find,	though,	that	empire’s	
attitudinal	and	cultural	effects	were	far	less	evident	and	that,	crucially,	when	they	did	
exist	they	were	determined	by	class.	Porter	does	affirm	that	the	British	elite	(especially	
its	aristocracy)	was	profoundly	imperialist	and	believed	in	its	mission	of	ruling	over	
others	(as	it	did	throughout	the	British	empire).	But	what	he	finds	no	evidence	for	is	
that	the	majority	class	in	Britain	had	any	interest	in	empire	or	actively	supported	it.	The	
reason	for	this,	he	argues,	lay	in	the	nature	of	Britain’s	two-nations	class	structure,	
which	was	premised	on	the	“principle	of	complemantarity,	rather	than	community	or	
commonality.”14	Porter	also	shows	that	even	the	middle	class	was	more	ambivalent	
about	imperialism	than	some	presume:	They	were	not	demonstratively	imperialist,	
were	more	interested	in	settlement	colonies	than	in	others,	and	had	no	distinctively	
imperial	ideas	of	their	own	(unlike	the	upper	classes).	His	conclusion	is	therefore	clear.	
Contra	Said:	“[T]here	can	be	no	presumption	that	Britain	–	the	Britain	that	stayed	at	
home	–	was	an	essentially	‘imperialist’	nation	in	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	
centuries.”15	
Said,	in	fact,	never	examines	either	the	working	class	or	women’s	movements.	
Yet	he	tars	them	both	with	imperial	sympathies.	And	he	even	concedes	that	there	is	a	
long	lull	in	representing	empire	in	the	British	novel	(which	he,	nonetheless,	regards	as	
born	imperial):	“But	most	of	the	great	nineteenth-century	realistic	novelists	are	less	
assertive	about	colonial	rule	and	possession	than	either	Defoe	or	late	writers	like	
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Conrad	and	Kipling”	(75).	There	is	no	question	that	imperial	presence	is	registered	in	
the	British	novel:	mentions	of	colonies,	characters	being	shipped	off	to	British	
dominions	or	shipped	back,	colonial	inheritances,	and	even	colonial	dispossession	as	
structuring	of	novelistic	plot	lines	and	as	shaping	fictive	events	(as	in	Wilkie	Collins’s	
The	Moonstone	[1868]	–	strangely	ignored	by	Said).	There	is	also	no	question	that	a	
whole	genre	of	colonial	travel	and	adventure	writing	arose	to	account	for	actual	
imperial	encounter,	especially	when	imperial	ideology	was	at	its	strongest	and	most	
widespread	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	(Conrad	is	its	high	literary	incarnation).16	But	
that	hardly	makes	the	British	novel	as	a	category	imperial,	or	makes	empire	(more	
sweepingly)	its	main	condition	of	possibility,	as	when	Said	says:	“Without	empire,	I	
would	go	so	far	as	saying,	there	is	no	European	novel	as	we	know	it”	(82).	The	picture	is	
more	complicated	and	nuanced	than	Said	posits.	Purely	by	virtue	of	representing	
history	and	capturing	various	historical	processes,	British	novels	could	have,	of	course,	
responded	to	colonialism	and	empire.	But	that	is	not	what	is	at	stake	here.	The	
argument	with	Said	is	not	whether	the	British	novel	contains	invocations,	traces,	or	
registers	of	empire.	These	are	undeniable.	The	argument	is	about	what	those	mean	and	
whether	the	whole	trajectory	of	the	British	novel	can	be	explained	by	empire.17	
A	famous	case	in	which	Said	deploys	this	reading	mode	is	Jane	Austen’s	
Mansfield	Park	(1814).	If	Raymond	Williams,	in	his	pioneering	reading	in	The	Country	
and	The	City	(1977),	saw	Sir	Thomas	Bertram	as	both	domestic	capitalist	owner	
(improver)	and	imperial	plantation	exploiter	(a	“great	West	Indian”	and	“a	colonial	
proprietor	in	the	sugar	island	of	Antigua”)	at	the	same	time,	Said	radically	revises	this	
assessment.18	He	insists	that	slavery	is	the	silenced	core	of	the	novel	–	even	though	that	
is	a	flawed	claim	because	Austen	was	an	abolitionist	and	her	main	protagonist	in	the	
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novel	actively	raises	the	topic	of	slavery	with	the	master	of	the	house.	Said	also	argues	
that	slavery	alone	makes	possible	Mansfield	Park	both	as	a	country	house	and	as	a	
novel.	I	will	later	on	examine	what	this	tells	us	about	Said’s	understanding	of	the	
relationship	between	capitalism	and	imperialism.	What,	though,	does	it	tell	us	about	
Said’s	critical	reading	practices?	That	empire	for	Said	is	the	primary	if	not	the	singular	
determiner	of	meaning	in	the	novel;	that	this	is	why	he	rejects	Williams’s	account	of	
empire	as	playing	only	a	part	in	a	wider	integrated	capitalist	accumulation	process;	and	
that	this	is	why	it	is	not	enough	for	him	to	argue,	as	Williams	does,	that	Mansfield	Park	
is	at	the	cutting	edge	of	the	moral	and	ideological	negotiation	between	different	
fractions	of	the	British	elite.	For	Said,	the	novel	has	to	be	actively	structured	by	the	
decisive	and	generative	power	of	empire,	which	trumps	all	else	in	explaining	the	novel.	
Austen	thus	exemplifies	a	core	notion	for	Said:	that	British	domestic	culture	is	simply	
imperialist	and	that	all	novels	and	intellectual	tracts	published	in	the	last	300	years	
identify	with	an	imperial	identity.	
This	far	is	clear.	But	what	has	not	been	explored	before	is	why	Said	believes	that	
British	domestic	culture	is	imperial.	I	want	to	argue	that	he	does	so	because	of	his	
particular	conception	of	empire	and	its	relationship	to	metropolitan	capitalism.	Said	
believes	that	empire	as	a	category	is	equivalent	to	British	“servants	in	grand	households	
and	in	novels”	and	“transient	workers”:	“profitable	without	being	fully	there”	(75).	But	
to	make	that	assumption	is	to	make	a	category	mistake.	Workers	have	a	different	
relationship	to	Britain	than	the	colonized,	and	the	British	working	class	is	much	more	
centrally	located	within	the	British	polity	than	the	imperialized	living	in	the	outlays	of	
empire.	By	putting	them	on	a	par	with	the	domestically	exploited	and	seeing	both	
servants	and	colonized	as	subjects	suffering	from	invisibility	and	silence,	Said	devises	
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his	job	as	literary	critic:	to	counter	their	exclusion	and	register	their	(overlooked)	voice	
and	presence	in	text.	
This	equivalence	and	lack	of	clear	distinction	between	different	social	categories	
suggests	that	Said	has	a	very	specific	understanding	of	empire.	And	this	is	my	point.	
Simply	put:	Said	assumes	that	the	imperialism	he	refers	to	is	of	the	settler-colonial	
variety	–	a	distinct	version	of	empire.	He	thus	regards	empire	as	a	way	of	life,	exactly	as	
it	is	for	America	in	relation	to	Native	Americans	and	for	Israel	in	relation	to	
Palestinians.19	In	such	settlement	societies,	the	frontier	is	close	to	home	and	the	struggle	
for	territory	and	sovereignty	shapes	all	aspects	of	life:	Empire	is	a	constitutive	part	of	
everyday	politics,	society,	and	culture.	The	colonized	native	is	not	out	there,	to	be	
ignored	or	forgotten	by	most,	but	in	here,	seen	as	either	an	immediate	threat	to	colonial	
security	and	survival	and	requiring	exclusion	(as	dispensable)	or	controlled	as	
exploited	labor.20	Whatever	the	case,	settler	colonies	are	different	from	purely	imperial	
societies.	William	Appleman	Williams	emphasizes	their	distinctive	nature	when	he	says:	
“We	Americans,	let	alone	our	English	[colonist]	forefathers,	have	produced	very,	very	
few	anti-imperialists.	Our	idiom	has	been	empire,	and	so	the	primary	division	was	and	
remains	between	the	soft	and	the	hard	[imperialists].”	In	settler	colonies,	empire	
permeates	all	core	aspects	of	life	and	the	anti-imperialism	(of	settlers)	is	a	far	more	
restricted	activity.21	
Said	transposes	this	understanding	of	settler	colonialism	to	empire	in	general.	
Rather	than	focus	on	the	specific	structures	and	histories	of	different	imperialisms	and	
their	commensurate	political	and	cultural	forms,	Said	posits	one	category	that	fits	all:	
control	of	land.	As	when	he	says,	“The	actual	geographical	possession	of	land	is	what	
empire	in	the	final	analysis	is	all	about	…	Imperialism	and	the	culture	associated	with	it	
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affirm	both	the	primacy	of	geography	and	an	ideology	about	control	of	territory”	(93).	
The	focus	on	land,	he	argues,	is	how	a	“spatial	moral	order”	is	sanctioned	“even	where	
colonies	are	not	insistently	or	even	perceptibly	in	evidence”	(94).	Spatiality	aids	the	
imperial	process	by	“validati[ng]	its	own	preferences	while	also	advocating	those	
preferences	in	conjunction	with	distant	imperial	rule”	(96)	and	by	“devalu[ing]	other	
worlds”	(97).	In	other	words,	empire	as	control	of	land	gives	you	a	culture	spatially	
structured	by	imperialism.	But	this	is	only	true	for	settler	colonies	that	require	
possession	of	land.	Said	presumes	that	the	effects	that	are	distinct	to	settler	colonialism	
are	general	to	all	forms	of	empire.	And	that	is	the	profoundly	consequential	slippage	
that	lies	at	the	heart	of	Culture	and	Imperialism	and	mars	it.	
Said	gives	empire	such	extensive	domestic	influence	for	another	reason.	Because	
he	believes	with	Fanon	that	“Europe	is	literally	the	creation	of	the	Third	World.	The	
wealth	which	smothers	her	is	that	which	was	stolen	from	the	underdeveloped	
peoples.”22	This	statement,	too,	is	not	without	its	problems.	That	Britain	and	France	
impoverished	the	Third	World	and	ravaged	its	independent	modes	of	existence	is	
without	doubt.	But	does	this	mean	that	Europe’s	overall	economic	and	material	self-
making	can	be	extrapolated	from	this	fact?	Not	really.	There	is	a	whole	tradition	of	
radical	critique	in	Britain	that	shows	that:	“Not	only	were	the	costs	of	imperialism	
higher	than	the	benefits:	the	benefits	went	to	the	few,	the	nation	paid	the	costs.”	A	host	
of	contemporary	economic	historians	have	also	argued	that	the	benefits	of	empire	were,	
in	fact,	underwhelming.	Peter	Cain	summarizes	these	findings	when	he	states	that	
“[key]	calculations	probably	indicate	the	upper	bounds	of	possible	gains	from	trading	
with	empire	before	1914	and	that,	if	underconsumption	is	taken	seriously,	the	empire	
may	even	have	had	a	negative	impact	on	British	growth.”	Indeed	“the	whole	imperial	
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exercise	was	actually	a	burden	on	the	economy	even	if	it	was	beneficial	to	some	
sectional	interests	such	as	traditional	elites.”	Cain’s	conclusion	goes	against	Fanon’s	
blanket	generalization	that	Said	shares:	Empire	“probably	slowed	down	the	
development	of	industry	in	Britain”	and	“undoubtedly	slowed	down	the	rate	of	social	
and	political	change.”23	Individual	imperialists	and	some	elite	sectors	did	benefit	from	
empire,	but	probably	at	the	cost	of	everyone	else.	These	economic	findings	thus	
undermine	the	notion	that	modern	Britain	was	economically	made	by	its	empire.	
The	same	conclusion	can	be	reached	about	the	profits	coming	specifically	from	
slavery.	In	his	symptomatic	reading	of	Mansfield	Park,	Said	relies	on	Eric	Williams’s	
Capitalism	and	Slavery	(1944)	to	show	how	central	plantation	profits	were	to	the	
development	of	industrial	Britain.	That	too,	however,	cannot	be	empirically	sustained.	
After	reviewing	the	economic	record,	Kenneth	Morgan	concludes:	“Slavery	and	Atlantic	
trade	made	an	important,	though	not	decisive,	impact	on	Britain’s	long-term	economic	
development	between	the	late	Stuart	era	and	the	early	Victorian	age,	playing	their	part	
in	enabling	Britain	to	become	the	workshop	of	the	world.”	But	that,	“[d]espite	the	
lucrative	returns	arising	from	these	[slave	plantation]	investments,	however,	the	
various	arguments	for	slavery	and	sugar’s	role	in	metropolitan	capital	accumulation	
have	not	proven	that	the	direct	connection	between	the	two	was	substantial.”	Individual	
plantation	owners	may	well	have	used	their	profits	in	“conspicuous	consumption”	back	
in	the	metropolis	to	build	country	houses,	“but	it	is	doubtful	whether	the	impetus	[to	
‘British	economic	development’]	was	on	a	sufficient	financial	scale	to	have	had	a	major	
impact.”24	
What	this	research	shows	is	clear:	Empire	did	contribute	to	metropolitan	
economy	and	society	and	it	did	shape	some	of	its	elite	forms	in	decisive	ways.	What	it	
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did	not	do	is	make	the	overall	basis	of	British	economy	possible.	Capitalism	did	that	–	as	
Raymond	Williams	had	originally	suggested.	As	Marx’s	analysis	in	Capital	shows,	a	
whole	world	of	colonial	loot	came	with	the	“primitive	accumulation”	that	announced	the	
emergence	of	capital	in	Europe:		
The	discovery	of	gold	and	silver	in	America,	the	extirpation,	
enslavement	and	entombment	in	mines	of	the	aboriginal	population,	the	
beginning	of	the	conquest	and	looting	of	the	East	Indies,	the	turning	of	
Africa	into	a	warren	for	the	commercial	hunting	of	black-skins,	signalised	
the	rosy	dawn	of	the	era	of	capitalist	production.	These	idyllic	
proceedings	are	the	chief	momenta	of	primitive	accumulation.	
What	Marx’s	materialist	conception	shows	is	that	it	is	capitalist	production	that	fueled	
colonial	exploitation,	not	the	other	way	around.25	
To	summarize	my	argument:	Because	Said	ignores	capitalism	and	class	as	
determinate	and	structuring	processes,	he	overestimates	the	significance	of	empire	in	
domestic	metropolitan	affairs.	By	replacing	political	economy	with	geography	and	by	
spatializing	empire,	distinct	causalities	and	determinations	are	ignored.	Imperial	center	
and	periphery	become	mutually	constitutive.	What	Said	risks	here	is	positing	that	
domestic	society	in	imperial	nations	is	as	determined	by	empire	as	colonized	society:	a	
negation	of	imperial	inequality	if	ever	there	was.26	To	avoid	such	distortions,	Said’s	two	
core	presumptions	need	to	be	rejected:	that	imperial	practices	have	wall-to-wall	
domestic	effects	and	that	domestic	culture	is	carte	blanche	imperial.	The	historical	
record	is	far	more	uneven	than	he	presumes,	and	far	more	determined	by	class	than	he	
wishes	to	acknowledge.	Rather	than	assuming	that	every	worker	and	humanist	was	an	
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imperialist,	the	work	of	pinpointing	the	influence	of	empire	should	be	a	more	
determinate	question.27	
Said	is	on	firmer	ground	when	he	argues	that	a	new	form	of	humanism	was	
generated	by	the	decolonization	struggle.	As	he	argues,	the	struggle	against	imperialism	
was	not	just	nationalist	but	had	a	universal	emancipatory	core	as	well.	It	shunned	the	
“national	bourgeoisie	and	their	specialized	elites,	of	which	Fanon	speaks	so	ominously,	
[that]	in	effect	tended	to	replace	the	colonial	force	with	a	new	class-based	and	
ultimately	exploitative	one,	which	replicated	the	old	colonial	structures	in	new	terms”	
(269).	Fanon	epitomizes	this	anticolonial	culture	for	Said:	a	universalist	who	struggles	
against	chauvinist	nativism	and	colonial	mimicry	and	formulates	an	alternative	politics	
of	liberation	instead.	Said	describes	Fanon’s	position	as	real	humanism:	“more	generous	
human	realities	of	community	among	cultures,	peoples,	societies.	This	community	is	the	
real	human	liberation	portended	by	the	resistance	to	imperialism”	(262).	If	Said	simply	
ignores	Fanon’s	clear	socialist	worldview	and	commitments,	he	does	anchor	his	own	
humanism	in	Fanon.	He	also	contrasts	it	with	“an	astonishing	sense	of	weightlessness	
with	regard	to	the	gravity	of	history”	(366–367)	that	postmodernism	represents	for	
him.	With	Césaire	(another	socialist	from	Martinique),	Said	affirms	that	“no	race	has	a	/	
monopoly	on	beauty,	on	intelligence,	on	strength”	and	that	“there	is	room	for	everyone	
at	the	convocation	of	conquest”	[or:	“rendezvous	of	victory”]	(279).	He	also	shows	that	
such	grand	narratives	of	emancipation	had	global	effects.	They	helped	spur	internal	
“humanist	opposition	to	colonial	practices	like	torture	and	deportation”	(292)	in	the	
metropolis.	These	came	not	only	from	colonial	émigrés	like	George	Padmore,	C.	L.	R.	
James,	and	Kwame	Nkrumah,	but	from	prominent	European	intellectuals	like	Jean-Paul	
Sartre	and	Jean	Genet	as	well.	
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What	Said	takes	from	this	decolonizing	generation	is	the	insistence	on	resistance.	
To	register	both	humanism’s	participation	in	domination	and	in	resistance	Said	
formulates	a	new	construct:	contrapuntal.	This	epitomizes	his	method	in	Culture	and	
Imperialism:	to	unpack	the	complexities	of	the	“intertwined	and	overlapping	histories”	
(19)	of	empire	while	emphasizing	its	conflictual	nature.	As	he	clearly	states:	“But	this	
global,	contrapuntal	analysis	should	be	modelled	not	(as	earlier	notions	of	comparative	
literature	were)	on	a	symphony	but	rather	on	an	atonal	ensemble;	we	must	take	into	
account	all	sorts	of	spatial	or	geographical	and	rhetorical	practices	–	inflections,	limits,	
constraints,	intrusions,	inclusions,	prohibitions	–	all	of	them	tending	to	elucidate	a	
complex	and	uneven	topography”	(386).	With	that,	Said	revises	Auerbach’s	cultural	
humanism	and	turns	it	into	a	global	critique	of	imperialism.	
Said’s	humanist	commitment	is	also	entangled	with	aesthetic	and	
nonsystematizing	preferences:	modernism	and	eclecticism.	Let	me	comment	on	both	
briefly.	Modernism	provides	Said	with	an	atonal	ensemble.	He	relies	on	it	to	critique	the	
imperial	real.	If	Orientalism	is	philosophically	seen	as	“a	radical	realism,”	as	a	language	
that	“is	considered	to	have	acquired,	or	more	simply	to	be,	reality,”	then	what	disrupts	
realism’s	seamless	connection	to	empire	is	the	antirepresentational	energies	of	
modernism.28	The	form’s	ironic	resistances	to	the	imperium	are	advanced	in	“A	Note	on	
Modernism”	in	Culture	and	Imperialism.	And	modernism’s	core	features	are	posited	as	a	
critical	response	to	empire:	“Conrad,	Forster,	Malraux,	T.	E.	Lawrence	take	narrative	
from	the	triumphalist	experience	of	imperialism	into	the	extremes	of	self-
consciousness,	discontinuity,	self-referentiality,	and	corrosive	irony,	whose	formal	
patterns	we	have	come	to	recognize	as	the	hallmarks	of	modernist	culture,	a	culture	
that	also	embraces	the	major	work	of	Joyce,	T.	S.	Eliot,	Proust,	Mann,	and	Yeats”	(227).	
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Said	favored	modernism	over	realism.	Though	his	first	two	books	had	absolutely	
nothing	to	do	with	empire	and	had	conventional	titles	like	Joseph	Conrad	and	the	
Fiction	of	Autobiography	(1966)	and	Beginnings:	Intention	and	Method	(1975),	they	
conveyed	Said’s	modernist	investments	and	his	methodological	tendencies.29	Conrad	
was	regarded	as	an	individual	mind	grappling	with	the	problems	of	objective	chaos	and	
egoistic	order.	And	Beginnings	were	conceptualized	as	a	source	of	potential	freedom	–	
as	departures,	discontinuities,	divergences,	displacements,	and	modes	of	
complementarity	and	adjacency.	These	were	contrasted	with	forms	of	restriction	that	
for	him	are	linearity,	succession,	mimesis,	dynasty,	and	theology.	Said	believed	that	a	
(molestive)	affiliation	is	superior	to	bounded	filiation.	What	Beginnings	ultimately	
articulates	is	Said’s	own	sense	of	critical	self-invention	and	political	rebirth	after	1967,	
but	at	this	stage	in	a	literary-philosophical	register	and	not	yet	in	the	language	of	
political	humanism	that	would	define	his	books	from	Orientalism	onward.	
There	are	lines	of	continuity	here,	especially	with	modernism.	Said’s	modernist	
investments,	evident	in	his	early	work,	are	transposed	onto	the	relationship	between	
empire	and	culture.	Against	the	authority	of	imperial	rule,	the	full	exilic	force	of	
modernist	anxiety	and	ambivalence	are	unleashed.	Realism	becomes	part	of	imperial	
representation	while	modernism	stands	in	the	vanguard	of	resistance	to	it.	The	problem	
with	that	is	that	such	a	binary	cannot	be	historically	sustained,	and	a	literary	mode	by	
itself	is	no	indication	of	orientation	toward	political	power.	Both	modernism	and	
realism	could	justify	empire.	If	modernism	can	give	you	a	communist	Bertolt	Brecht	or	a	
Fascist	Ezra	Pound,	realism	can	give	you	an	anti-imperialist	George	Orwell	or	an	
imperialist	Kipling.	Said	ignores	the	ramifications	of	this	point.	Embedded	in	his	
analysis	is	the	notion	that,	because	modernism	is	ambivalent	and	ironic,	it	is	a	
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historically	progressive	literary	mode.	But	that	is	a	context-specific	question	and	
depends	on	many	other	variables.	It	is	impossible	to	read	into	a	representational	crisis	
like	modernism	one	kind	of	political	attitude	or	another.	If	Said	seems	aware	of	this	
when	he	suggests	that	Conrad	is	both	imperialist	and	anti-imperialist,	he	does	not	
change	his	overall	conception	of	modernism	as	simply	an	anti-empire	mode.	
The	emphasis	on	discontinuities	is	a	key	element	in	Said’s	theoretical	toolkit.	
Discontinuities	disrupt	authorities,	solidarities,	and	systems	–	which	Said	tends	to	
regard	as	oppressive.	That	is	why	Said	advances	the	notion	of	“never	solidarity	before	
criticism.”	Criticism	stands	over	solidarity.	It	is	also	elevated	over	method.	The	“dangers	
of	method	and	system”	is	of	becoming	“sovereign”	and	having	“their	practitioners	lose	
touch	with	the	resistance	and	heterogeneity	of	civil	society.”	To	avoid	this	eventuality	is	
to	embrace	eclecticism.	As	Said	put	it	in	an	illuminating	interview	in	1995:	“[O]ne	is	
moved	in	ways	that	are	mysterious,	and	that	is	better	for	me	than	trying	to	find	some	
system	to	contain	them	[interests]	all.	I	am	invariably	criticised	by	younger	
postcolonialists	(Ahmad,	etc.)	for	being	inconsistent	and	untheoretical,	and	I	find	that	I	
like	that,	who	wants	to	be	consistent?”30	If	system	is	external	and	imposing,	what	is	
needed	is	something	closer	to	the	modernist	sensibility	he	held	so	dear:	atonal	rupture.	
‘‘Criticism	in	short	is	always	situated;	it	is	sceptical,	secular,	reflectively	open	to	its	own	
failings.”31	
Whether	one	agrees	with	Said’s	methodological	preferences,	they	were	guided	
by	one	political	constant:	his	commitment	to	truth	and	justice.32	This	comes	across	most	
powerfully	in	his	work	on	Palestine.	Whether	as	a	Palestinian	nationalist	in	the	1970s	
and	1980s	or	as	both	a	critical	nationalist	and	binationalist	after	the	capitulation	of	the	
Palestinian	Liberation	Organization	(PLO)	in	the	Oslo	Peace	Accords	of	1993,	Said	
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actively	participated	in	the	struggle	for	Palestinian	justice	and	liberation.	In	his	most	
radical	work,	Said	articulated	the	urgent	necessity	of	both	Palestinian	self-criticism	and	
the	critique	of	Israeli	power.	For	the	first	time	since	the	rise	of	“Palestinianism,”	Said	
developed	an	internal	critique	of	Palestinian	elite	nationalism	that	mirrors	Fanon	on	the	
social	betrayals	of	the	“national	bourgeoisie.”	Said’s	anti-PLO	Peace	and	Its	Discontents	
thus	performs	a	similar	task	to	Fanon’s	The	Wretched	of	the	Earth.	By	holding	out	for	
the	justice	embodied	in	the	popular	self-organized	mobilizations	of	the	first	intifada,	
Said	affirms	the	potentialities	of	mass	politics	against	a	defeatist	Palestinian	elite.	He	
also	exposes	a	whole	imperial	morality	when	he	argues	that:	“Peace	really	means	peace	
between	equals;	it	means	freedom	and	equality	for	both	peoples,	not	just	one,	nor	peace	
for	one	as	a	lesser	appendage	to	the	other,	who	has	full	rights	and	security.	Above	all	it	
means	understanding	the	coherence	and	integrity	of	our	own	history	as	Palestinians	
and	Arabs.”33	Such	judgments	exemplify	Said’s	political	humanism.	As	Noam	Chomsky	
acknowledged,	Said’s	life	project	sought	to	undermine	both	the	dominant	principles	of	
empire	and	the	culture	of	imperialism.34	Herein	lies	his	real	political	legacy.	
This	volume	ruminates	on	the	problems	and	opportunities	afforded	by	Said’s	
work:	its	productive	and	generative	capacities	as	well	as	its	in-built	limitations.	After	
Said	aims	to	capture	the	essence	of	Said’s	intellectual	and	political	contribution	and	his	
extensive	impact	on	postcolonial	studies;	it	also	reflects	on	what	comes	after	Said.	How	
have	literary	criticism	and	literary	and	political	theory	changed	in	the	light	of	Said’s	
field-shaping	and	multifaceted	interventions?	The	main	objective	of	this	volume	is	to	
examine	Said’s	legacy	both	intensively	and	extensively:	by	critically	elaborating	his	core	
concepts	and	arguments	and	by	tracing	some	of	their	significant	afterlives.	
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By	moving	simultaneously	inward	into	Said’s	oeuvre	and	outward	to	his	growing	
legacy,	this	volume	reframes	and	refashions	key	areas	in	the	postcolonial	literary	field,	
especially	the	relationship	between	imperialism	and	culture.	Critical	thought	after	Said	
requires	radical	reorientations.	Does	the	contemporary	political	moment,	marked	by	
imperial	war,	disorder,	and	neoliberal	economic	crisis,	usher	in	the	return	of	politics	
and	political	economy	in	postcolonial	studies?	What	happens	to	postcolonial	studies	
with	capital	(rather	than	just	culture)	as	a	core	analytic	category?	A	materialist	Said	is	
here	excavated	to	fortify	a	materialist	critique	of	historical	and	contemporary	
imperialism.	
The	volume	is	divided	into	three	interconnected	clusters.	
First:	clarifying	Said’s	key	concepts,	interpretations,	and	critical	contributions	
from	his	earliest	book	on	Conrad	to	his	Adornian	ruminations	on	exile.	Examined	here	
are	Said’s	formative	humanism,	critique	of	Orientalism,	own	distinction	as	postcolonial	
theorist,	and	rich	response	to	exile	as	a	mode	of	critical	affiliation.	Conor	McCarthy	
captures	Said’s	birth	as	a	critic	and	his	early	intellectual	investments	in	modernist	exile	
and	philological	humanism	that	shape	his	life	project.	Vivek	Chibber	zooms	in	on	the	
dual	legacy	of	Orientalism	as	both	razor-sharp	critique	of	imperial	ideology	and	
theoretically	contradictory	and	shows	how	through	its	culturalism	the	book	risks	
disabling	its	own	resources	of	political	critique.	Seamus	Deane	revisits	Culture	and	
Imperialism	and	Said’s	project	of	moving	American	criticism	to	a	critique	empire,	and	
he	too	thinks	about	the	costs	of	dismissing	Marxism	and	turning	imperial	violence	into	a	
question	of	culture.	Keya	Ganguly	identifies	the	contours	of	Said’s	exilic	standpoint,	
identifies	its	political	determination	by	Palestinian	dispossession,	and	shows	how	
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concepts	like	the	contrapuntal	and	the	paratactic	express	real-world	irreconcilabilities	
and	historical	irresolution.	
Second:	charting	Said’s	transformation	of	key	intellectual	fields	and	his	
generative	intellectual	legacy.	Examined	here	are	Said’s	seminal	reinterpretation	and	
reframing	of	the	British	literary	canon	from	the	perspective	of	empire,	his	emerging	
impact	on	the	political	theory	of	empire,	the	struggles	between	postcolonialism	and	
theories	of	world	literature,	and	the	inflations	of	postcolonial	modernism	as	an	
anticolonial	transnational	mode.	Lauren	M.	E.	Goodlad	reads	nineteenth-century	British	
literature	contrapuntally	after	Said	as	“a	world-system	in	motion,”	remobilizes	existing	
links	between	capitalism	and	colony	and	reformulates	Jane	Austen’s	Mansfield	Park	as	
“a	groundbreaking	novel	of	geopolitical	consciousness”	–	productively	engaging	
Raymond	Williams	in	the	process.	Jeanne	Morefield	identifies	the	value	of	Said’s	
contrapuntal	disposition	for	the	“turn	to	empire”	in	political	theory	and	posits	its	
importance	for	analyzing	contemporary	American	imperial	power.	Joe	Cleary	shows	
how	postcolonial	criticism	ran	up	against	its	own	culturalist	limitations	and	neglected	
the	crucial	resources	of	a	sociology	of	culture,	thus	allowing	world-system	theory	to	
step	in	and	challenge	its	global	ambition	–	where	should	radical	theory	go	from	here?	
Dougal	McNeill	shows	how	the	Saidian	inflation	of	modernism	has	contributed	to	the	
distortions	of	transnational	modernism,	obscuring	the	key	role	that	realism	and	the	
universalization	of	capitalism	play	in	contemporary	culture.	
Third:	focusing	on	key	areas	of	Said’s	afterlives.	Examined	here	are	theoretical	
and	political	issues	crucial	to	postcolonial	studies	today,	such	as	migration	and	exile;	the	
resurgence	of	orientalism	and	Islamophobia;	and	the	crucial	significance	of	political	
economy	to	the	analysis	of	imperialism	after	the	Iraq	War.	Joan	Cocks	critically	engages	
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with	Said	and	Freud	on	exile	to	advance	a	politics	of	possibility	for	both	strangers	and	
natives	in	our	turbulent	present,	connecting	immigration	with	alleviating	the	domestic	
problems	of	class	inequality.	Saree	Makdisi	renews	the	ideological	critique	of	
orientalism	today	in	order	to	counter	an	America-led	global	demonization	of	Islam	after	
9/11	that	dovetails	with	America’s	resurgent	imperial	policy.	Robert	Spencer	calls	on	
the	resources	of	political	economy	(ignored	by	Said)	to	reveal	the	role	of	American	
imperialism	in	the	organization	of	the	global	economy	and	in	the	neoliberal	resurgence	
of	capitalism	and	shows	how	it	is	simply	impossible	to	understand	the	Iraq	War	without	
them.	
The	combined	effect	of	After	Said	is	clear:	a	materialist	postcolonial	study	that	
takes	both	capitalism	and	imperialism	seriously	as	core	and	connected	categories	of	
analysis,	and	that	critiques	the	forms	of	culture	they	both	generate	to	justify	their	
dominations.	Only	then	can	the	field	join	with	Raymond	Williams	and	say:	“I	believe	that	
the	system	of	meanings	and	values	which	a	capitalist	society	has	generated	has	to	be	
defeated	in	general	and	in	detail	by	the	most	sustained	kinds	of	intellectual	and	
educational	work.”35	For	Williams,	the	Welsh	European,	that	meant	defeating	capitalism	
on	an	imperial	scale:	an	objective	worth	upholding	both	in	theory	and	in	practice.	
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